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The Rise of “Bad Civil Society” in Israel 
Nationalist Civil Society Organizations and the Politics of Delegitimization 
Amal Jamal 
Civil society in Israel has been undergoing a growing conflict that mirrors broader 
trends taking place in Israeli society, namely the conflict between the rising conserva-
tive nationalist social forces and the dwindling liberal and humanist camp represented 
by human rights organizations (HROs). There has been a clear rise in the power of con-
servative nationalist civil society organizations (CSOs), which receive firm support from 
politicians who have influential positions in the Israeli government. These organizations 
have been leading aggressive political and media campaigns against HROs, especially 
those involved in defending the rights of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation 
in the West Bank and under siege in the Gaza Strip. The conservative nationalist CSOs 
accuse HROs of being anti-patriotic and cooperating with the enemies of society and 
the state. They utilize three strategies to promote their agenda. The first is delegitimiz-
ing HROs through naming and shaming tactics. They lead well-orchestrated political 
and media campaigns that associate HROs with terrorist organizations. The second 
is silencing HROs by shaming the institutions – educational, cultural, and media – that 
invite the former to speak to their audiences. The third strategy is cutting off the sources 
of funding for HROs through lobbying activities in donor countries and putting pres-
sure on governments to stop their funding of the former. 
 
Any observer of the Israeli political scene 
over the last several years cannot miss the 
well-orchestrated legal and political cam-
paigns against liberal social forces and 
HROs in Israel. These campaigns, led by a 
coalition of conservative nationalist CSOs 
and very influential politicians and politi-
cal parties represented in the Knesset, are 
tied strongly to the rising power of radical 
nationalist social forces in Israeli society. 
The unholy alliance between nationalist 
CSOs and legislators makes use of demo-
cratic procedures to silence and delegiti-
mize any critiques of government policies, 
especially those voiced by HROs highlight-
ing the ramifications of the expanding 
settlement project on the daily lives of Pal-
estinians in the West Bank. The campaigns 
against HROs, which have received popular 
backing and acceptance by the government, 
are only one component of a broader trans-
formation taking place in Israeli society 
and politics over the last few years. This 
broader transformation has been institu-
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tionalized within major legislative pro-
cesses and policies that target not only 
HROs, but also liberal social forces, minor-
ities, and critical media outlets. These same 
processes are responsible for the rising ten-
sions between proponents of the settlers’ 
movement in the occupied Palestinian ter-
ritories (OPTs) – including East Jerusalem – 
on the one hand, and supporters of Israeli 
withdrawal from these areas in order to 
protect the Jewish and democratic char-
acter of the Israeli state, on the other. 
This process of radicalization has not 
been linear, and there has been strong push-
back by liberal forces seeking to protect the 
liberal spaces in Israeli society. Nonetheless, 
the well-orchestrated efforts to reduce the 
liberal-democratic spaces that have charac-
terized the Israeli political system through 
the promotion of illiberal, religious-nation-
alist, and anti-human-rights ideals seem to 
have gained the upper hand. The process 
of radicalization, especially as reflected in 
the campaigns against HROs, goes beyond 
the traditional, well-known differentiation 
between right and left in Israel and could 
be viewed as gaining traction in the com-
petition for influence on state polices in 
various fields, especially in economic, secu-
rity, and foreign policy, as well as the char-
acter and identity of the state of Israel. 
The conflict between conservative nation-
alist CSOs and the HROs in Israel is strongly 
related to a broader debate in the profes-
sional literature concerning the nature and 
role of civil society in democratic cultures. 
It has been a common tenet in the pro-
fessional literature that civil society is 
largely comprised of those civil initiatives, 
movements, and organizations that seek 
to promote and protect civic and liberal 
values – such as pluralism, tolerance, free-
dom, social justice, and human rights – 
against restrictive state policies. This per-
ception of civil society, known as “the civil 
society argument,” considers vibrant civic 
activism as a major reason for – and guar-
antor of – the rise and sustainability of 
democratic regimes and cultures. However, 
a one-dimensional affinity between civic 
activism and democracy and liberal values 
has been fiercely challenged over the last 
few decades. Many scholars have demon-
strated that CSOs could be deeply involved 
in anti-democratic initiatives and the ex-
clusive promotion of nationalist, religious, 
or racialist ideals. These experiences have 
led to the differentiation between “good” 
and “bad” civil society, based on the con-
tributions of CSOs toward the promotion – 
or the dismantling – of open and democratic 
societies. Bad civil society is not marked by 
opposition to the liberal worldview or criti-
cism of liberal opponents, but mainly by 
the combination of advancing chauvinistic 
nationalist or religious ideals and targeting 
the legitimate existence of liberal opponents 
through various means, especially shaming, 
stigmatizing, silencing, and lobbying tactics 
that are aimed at outlawing or shrinking 
the financial resources of their opponents. 
This normative differentiation is not 
strictly dichotomous and is contiguous. 
CSOs whose raison d’être is the tolerance 
of differences in the name of civic values – 
even when they promote conservative 
worldviews – differ from CSOs that utilize 
the open civic sphere to propagate a chau-
vinistic nationalist worldview, and in this 
spirit view critical civic initiatives as detri-
mental to society and the state. These CSOs 
view differences in perceptions of society 
and the state as being sufficient justifica-
tion for silencing or delegitimizing others. 
CSOs that cross the boundaries of legiti-
mate debate on differences, advance a 
narrow, nationalist worldview, and lobby 
for state practices that delegitimize, stig-
matize, silence, or seek to outlaw critical 
CSOs – thereby limiting the space for dif-
ferences and debate in civil society – could 
be depicted as “bad civil society.” 
One cannot but speak of the rise of bad 
civil society in Israel when looking at the 
transformations taking place in Israeli civil 
society. In addition to those mentioned 
above, a growing number of CSOs are cross-
ing the boundaries of legitimate competi-
tion between different worldviews and pro-
moting hate speech, exclusive nationalist 
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values and practices, attacking HROs and 
delegitimizing their role, and cooperating 
with political parties in order to promote 
legislation that seeks to silence liberal 
CSOs and narrow the democratic spaces 
in society and the state. 
The rising influence of nationalist CSOs – 
such as Im Tirtzu, My Israel, Regavim, Leava, 
Shurat HaDin, the Institute for Zionist 
Strategy, NGO Monitor, and many others – 
illustrates this process, despite the fact 
that these CSOs are not equally radical and 
aggressive in their worldviews, goals, and 
means. They do not fall within the tradi-
tional “right”/“left” political dichotomy of 
Israel. Nonetheless, most of them utilize 
nationalist discourse to win support, stig-
matize liberal HROs as enemies, and facili-
tate sophisticated lobbying policies that 
delegitimize HROs and frame them as anti-
patriotic political organizations, thereby 
encouraging government measures that 
will cut them off from their financial 
resources. One of the common features 
of the policies of these organizations is 
blurring the differences between marking 
the violations of basic human rights of 
Palestinians and making accusations that 
HROs are protecting – or even assisting – 
terrorists or associated individuals and 
organizations. 
These CSOs are advocating and lobbying 
for more nationalist government policies 
and mobilizing popular support through 
the stigmatization not only of HROs, but 
also the liberal social forces supporting 
them. They are also utilizing media cam-
paigns in order to frame HROs as “enemies 
of the state and society.” Such efforts go 
beyond legitimate competition between 
various CSOs over state policies and over 
public opinion, which, according to the 
professional literature, reflect the essence 
of civil society. Nationalist CSOs also dis-
approve of the basic values of pluralism 
when these do not match their perceptions 
of reality. The cooperation of “bad civil 
society” with – and support from – govern-
ment ministries and central political par-
ties feeds the Israeli public sphere with 
anti-democratic values and norms, which 
undermines civil and democratic ideals 
and liberal freedoms and brings the entire 
democratic system into question. Below are 
a few basic examples that demonstrate the 
tools and policies utilized by “bad civil 
society” organizations in their attempts to 
determine the results of their “war” against 
HROs and their liberal supporters. 
Attacking Academic Freedom and 
Silencing Liberal Voices 
One of the best examples of the policies 
and tools utilized by nationalist CSOs is 
the silencing of liberal voices in the Israeli 
public sphere, especially in academia. Im 
Tirtzu and the Institute for Zionist Strat-
egies started a media campaign in 2009–
2010 seeking to put limits on academic 
freedom in Israel. They sought to intimi-
date academic institutions based on the 
political worldviews of some of their pro-
fessors. They demanded that these insti-
tutions identify academic staff members 
according to the degree of their loyalties 
to the Zionist values of the state. The well-
orchestrated campaign of these two nation-
alist CSOs started with the presentation 
of selective data concerning the teaching 
syllabi of professors and measuring their 
pro- or post-Zionist commitments. The two 
organizations argued in their “studies” that 
most of the literature taught by most of the 
professors in the departments of sociology 
and political science was critical of Israel 
and represented an ideological bias of post-
Zionist or anti-Zionist tendencies question-
ing the moral justifications of the state 
of Israel. The well-orchestrated campaign 
sought to shame the publicly funded aca-
demic institutions and mobilize public 
opinion against them. The two organiza-
tions lobbied the education committee in 
the Knesset, dominated by nationalist par-
ties, to discuss their reports and demand 
that universities take action against pro-
fessors critical of the official Zionist nar-
rative and of government policies toward 
Palestinians. 
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This campaign against academic free-
dom manifested itself again with the initia-
tive – supported by Education Minister Naf-
tali Bennett – from the Habayit Hayehudi 
(Jewish Home) Party to draft an “ethical 
code” for all academic institutions in Israel. 
The declarations made by the minister and 
the involvement of Im Tirtzu and other 
nationalist CSOs in lobbying for the ethical 
code reflected the deep affinity between 
nationalist CSOs and government minis-
tries. Declarations made by the education 
minister made it clear that the code sought 
to fight against post-Zionist professors in 
academia. CSOs supporting this position 
sought to limit academics from expressing 
any political views on publicly disputed 
topics while teaching. The proposed ethical 
code reflected the real intentions of the 
minister and his supporters in civil society, 
since “political activity” was defined in broad 
terms. According to the initiative, any 
activity that reflects “support” for or “oppo-
sition” to a political party or representative 
of a political party – or that could be con-
ceived of as taking a position vis-à-vis a dis-
puted public issue being discussed in the 
Knesset and/or in the public sphere – should 
be viewed as being unethical and should be 
punished. Implementing such an under-
standing would have translated into a situa-
tion in which voices critical of the current 
status quo, especially the settler movement 
in the OPTs, would be silenced. 
Whereas most academic institutions, 
liberal intellectuals, and student unions 
viewed this effort as a clear attempt to limit 
academic freedom and silence voices criti-
cal of government policies, many conserva-
tive nationalist CSOs expressed satisfaction 
with putting an ethical code in place. In 
response, 300 academics signed a petition 
in December 2016 stating that they would 
ignore the instructions of the ethical code 
and expressed outrage at the attempts to 
promote censorship in academia. The cam-
paign has not ended yet, and efforts to 
shame academic institutions and personnel 
continue. 
Delegitimizing and Stigmatizing HROs 
Another example illustrating the problem-
atic character of the new generation of 
nationalist CSOs are the harsh critiques of 
20 HROs compiled in a very selective and 
slanted report published by Im Tirtzu in 
2015. “The Foreign Agents 2015” report por-
trays the 20 HROs, such as B’Tselem, Yesh 
Din, Adallah, and others, as “political propa-
ganda organizations that act from within 
with broad financial support of foreign coun-
tries against Israeli society, against soldiers 
of the IDF and against the ability of the state 
to protect itself in its war against terror.” 
The Im Tirtzu report was accompanied 
by a media campaign and a controversial 
video called “The Foreign Agents – Re-
vealed!,” in which several well-known civic 
activists were associated with HROs and 
accused of being foreign agents as well as 
assisting the enemies of the state by raising 
money from foreign countries in order to 
support these enemies or defend them in 
the courts. It states: “While we fight terror, 
they fight us,” clearly portraying these 
CSOs as enemies of Israeli society. Depicting 
HROs as cooperating with the enemies of 
the people in a situation of war was aimed 
at delegitimizing them and inciting the 
public and the state to take action against 
them. As a result of the campaign, many 
human rights activists expressed their fears 
of being attacked on the streets. 
The extremist and inciting language of 
the video led politicians – even from the 
conservative right – to express dissatisfac-
tion with it, including Prime Minister Ben-
jamin Netanyahu, who argued that he does 
not like the idea of naming those who do 
not agree with him as enemies. Nonethe-
less, many nationalist CSOs and politicians 
supported the spirit of the video and pushed 
for legislation to put an end to this phe-
nomenon. 
Lobbying against the Funding of HROs 
Another example of the rising exclusionist 
character of nationalist CSOs in Israel are 
the efforts to block the financial support of 
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HROs. A case at hand are the efforts being 
made by NGO Monitor – led by a Bar-Ilan 
University professor, Gerald Steinberg – 
to reach out to foundations and states and 
present them with data that associates 
their support for HROs with anti-Israel cam-
paigns – such as boycott, divestment, and 
sanctions (BDS) – with anti-Semitic initia-
tives or even terrorist organizations. The 
intentions of NGO Monitor are stated in its 
documents, namely “providing information 
and analysis, promoting accountability, 
and supporting discussion on the reports 
and activities of NGOs, claiming to advance 
human rights and humanitarian agendas.” 
Despite its strong cooperation with govern-
ment officials, the organization distances 
itself from the government, stating that it 
“was founded jointly with the Wechsler 
Family Foundation,” that all its funding 
“is provided by private donors and founda-
tions,” and that it “receives no governmen-
tal support.” The diplomatic formulations 
of NGO Monitor cannot hide its coopera-
tion with government offices, such as the 
Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, or with nationalist 
members of the Knesset, in order to pro-
mote its goals of delegitimizing HROs and 
diminishing their financial resources. The 
tactics of NGO Monitor are: having its rep-
resentatives appear together with officials 
of the Israeli state in international settings 
and presenting a common position; attack-
ing Israeli and Palestinian HROs; accusing 
them of providing false information with 
regard to Israeli policies in the OPTs; and 
associating them with either BDS activities, 
anti-Semitic activities, or even terrorist 
organizations. Steinberg, president of NGO 
Monitor, argued that “[l]arge-scale foreign 
(mostly European) government funding to 
Israeli political groups, under facades such 
as civil society, human rights, peace- or 
democracy-building, and which does not 
take place in any other democracy, is seen 
as an attack on Israeli sovereignty and 
democratic self-determination.” 
NGO Monitor states that one of its pri-
mary objectives in Europe is to significantly 
reduce the massive amount of government 
funding – for what it considers radical CSOs 
– received directly from the EU, its 28 mem-
ber states, Norway, and Switzerland, as well 
as through indirect channels via European 
Christian aid frameworks. It admits that, 
in 2013, it made significant progress in a 
number of key areas following a strategy 
described as “naming and shaming.” Ac-
cordingly, it claims that the efforts have 
produced important results, including the 
discontinuation of European funding for 
a number of politicized CSOs active in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. One good example 
to illustrate NGO Monitor’s strategy is its 
lobbying in the United States (US) and the 
United Kingdom (UK) against donations for 
the New Israel Fund (NIF). The representa-
tives of NGO Monitor target potential NIF 
donors to convince them to stop their sup-
port for it, since the NIF, in their view, pro-
motes anti-Israeli political projects, illus-
trated by the support given to the Associa-
tion of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and 
Adalah. These efforts followed an accusa-
tion made by Im Tirtzu that CSOs supported 
by the NIF stood behind most of the infor-
mation provided to the Goldstone Report, 
which accused the Israeli army of violating 
international humanitarian law during 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008. An-
other example is the “Domino Strategy,” 
presented by NGO Monitor in its 2016 
report. This strategy aims to put pressure 
on European governments to review their 
funding for what NGO Monitor considers 
“anti-Israeli NGOs” by lobbying the respec-
tive parliaments. This was implemented in 
several European parliaments, including 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, 
the UK, Germany, Norway, Finland, and 
the European Parliament. 
These efforts of shaming and silencing 
are strongly related to efforts made by 
other nationalist CSOs to promote nation-
alist legislation, such as the promotion of 
the “Nation-State Bill” of the Institute for 
Zionist Strategies. Aside from the many bills 
awaiting discussion in the Knesset, these 
efforts aim at restructuring the Israeli state 
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and regime while submitting democracy to 
nationalist and religious values. The religion-
ization process taking place in Israeli soci-
ety, as reflected in many public opinion sur-
veys, puts wind in the sails of these trends. 
Legislating the Surveillance of HROs 
The attacks on HROs also come from high 
up in the government. This is reflected in a 
clear legislative process in the Knesset that 
establishes the differences between legiti-
mate and illegitimate civic engagement 
and activism. This process seeks to avoid 
being characterized as anti-civil or anti-
liberal while still being able to put pressure 
and limits on particular forms of civic 
engagement and certain CSOs, especially 
those that are associated with the “peace 
camp” or promote the language of human 
rights and social justice for all, including 
Palestinians. 
A good example is the so-called NGO Law, 
whose precursors date back to at least 2007. 
Since then, the Knesset has seen various 
attempts to advance an amendment that 
aims at enforcing the state’s supervision and 
surveillance of CSO activities and financing, 
especially by the CSO Registrar in the Jus-
tice Ministry. One of the most prominent 
amendments to the law is Amendment 36a 
from 2008, which requires CSOs to reveal 
their sources of financing and reinforces 
previous state supervisory provisions. 
Extreme nationalist members of the Knes-
set (MKs) were not satisfied with the 2008 
amendments. Political parties in Netanya-
hu’s second government since 2009 – espe-
cially Israel Beytenu and Shas, and assisted 
by key members in the ruling Likud Party – 
sought the tightening of state supervision 
over HROs, arguing that they endangered 
national security and served foreign inter-
ests. The right-wing parties’ aspirations 
were based on allegations made by nation-
alist CSOs, such as Im Tirtzu, that HROs are 
financed by foreign governments and hos-
tile foundations. 
MK Ofir Akunis proposed an amendment 
of the same NGO Law (Amendment – Prohi-
bition of Foreign Political Entity’s Support 
of Political Associations in Israel) in March 
2010 and again in November 2011. The pur-
pose was to prevent associations in Israel 
from receiving donations from foreign gov-
ernments and institutions (the UN, the EU), 
since, according to the bill, the “human 
rights organizations” were acting provoca-
tively in their attempts to influence Israel’s 
political discourse, its nature, and policies. 
On February 27, 2012, five right-wing 
MKs – Michael Ben-Ari, Aryeh Eldad, Nissim 
Ze’ev, Ronit Tirosh, and Uri Ariel – proposed 
an amendment regarding maximum wages 
in CSOs, intending to “[block] attempts for 
unsuitable and unbalanced exploitation 
of public funds in public CSOs.” After the 
2013 elections, efforts continued toward 
legislating against CSOs thought to be 
“harming” Israel’s image and “assisting” 
enemies of the state. On December 15, 
2013, the ministerial legislative committee 
approved a bill proposed by Ayelet Shaked, 
an MK of the Jewish Home Party who be-
came Israel’s Minister of Justice after the 
2015 elections; this was the first step before 
forwarding the bill to parliament. The bill 
sought to impose a tax of 45 percent on all 
organizations receiving donations from for-
eign entities and included punitive meas-
ures for activities involving calls to boycott 
Israel or attempts to put soldiers on trial in 
international courts. 
The approval of the bill on the govern-
ment level led opposition leaders to voice 
their critiques. The opposition leader at the 
time, MK Isaac Herzog of the Labor Party, 
clearly stated that the committee’s decision 
was “dark, anti-democratic, and shut the 
mouths of those who dare to think differ-
ently from it. The next phase of the imple-
mentation of the law is the establishment 
of thought police that will determine who 
will pay a fine because of his views and who 
will not, who will enter the black political 
list and who will not. Israel is becoming less 
and less democratic.” 
Legislative efforts to curb civil society 
activism continued also after the 2015 elec-
tions. Shaked, now Minister of Justice, was 
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heading the entire justice system and has 
continued her efforts to censor critiques of 
the government voiced by liberal CSOs and 
to limit the activities of HROs in the OPTs 
who reveal the violations of basic human 
rights of Palestinians that result from poli-
cies promoted mainly by Shaked’s party. 
The justification utilized this time to pro-
mote the repressive legislation was the need 
for transparency. On July 16, 2016, the gov-
ernment managed to gain a majority of 
votes (57–48) and passed the “Transparency 
Bill” in the Knesset. The ideological nature 
of the new law is revealed through the fact 
that it does not relate to CSOs funded by 
private sources, which is the case for most 
major CSOs associated with the conserva-
tive nationalist right. Hence, the wording 
of the law was intentionally formulated to 
protect them. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu supported the 
move, clarifying that “[t]ransparency is the 
heart of democracy. When you hear about 
the use and abuse of NGOs here – transpar-
ency is the least we want and is much war-
ranted and it is common sense. Israel is being 
held to a different standard here.” This 
argument by Netanyahu – whose personal 
position was revealed in his decision to can-
cel a planned meeting in April 2017 with 
German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel 
for the latter’s meeting with two leading 
HROs in Israel – reflects the cunning attempt 
to instrumentalize democratic transparency 
in order to put pressure on HROs. 
Ambassadors of Germany, the UK, France, 
Holland, the EU, and the US expressed con-
cern about the proposed legislation. The 
European Commission criticized the bill, 
saying that its demands on CSOs would go 
“beyond the legitimate need for transpar-
ency” and that it is seemingly “aimed at 
constraining the activities of these CSOs 
working in Israel.” 
After a meeting of the Ambassador with 
Israeli Justice Minister Shaked, the Ameri-
can Embassy in Tel Aviv issued an unusual 
press statement in which it stated that “Am-
bassador Shapiro sought more information 
about the draft legislation from the Minis-
ter, and noted the US government’s con-
cerns on the matter.” Furthermore, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her 
concern about the proposed NGO’s Trans-
parency Bill in a meeting with Prime Minis-
ter Netanyahu on February 16, 2016, in 
Berlin. Human rights activists defined the 
meaning of the legislative process as a way 
of branding them “traitors.” Many argued 
that it was worrying since it was coming 
from high up in the government, as well 
as from the mainstream press. 
The bill, promoted by Justice Minister 
Shaked, was added to the list of laws in 
Israel that, in the name of “progressive” 
ideals, promote more government surveil-
lance and control over the activities and 
engagement of liberal and human rights 
civic activists. Indicative of the spirit of the 
times were the words expressed by opposi-
tion leader Isaac Herzog, who said that the 
NGO Law “is indicative, more than any-
thing, of the budding fascism creeping into 
Israeli society.” 
Policy Recommendations 
1) It is important for leading democratic 
countries – especially those close to Israel, 
such as Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, 
France, Italy, Australia, and Canada – to ex-
press their critiques of the legislative meas-
ures of the Israeli parliament and in the 
public sphere. Popular anti-liberal and anti-
human rights trends have the upper hand, 
especially since they are supported by pro-
minent leaders such as Prime Minister 
Netanyahu. Nonetheless, the political real-
ity in Israel is fluid and dynamic. Exerting 
pressure from the outside – especially on 
states that provide economic assistance not 
only to liberal CSOs, but also to the Israeli 
government, which diverts some of these 
resources to the promotion of nationalist 
projects that violate human rights – could 
be of great importance in insisting on demo-
cratic, liberal, and human rights values. 
2) Donors, whether governments or pri-
vate institutions, should not fall into the 
trap of the populist discourse propagated 
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by nationalist CSOs that seek to blur the 
differences between marking violations 
of basic human rights of Palestinians and 
accusations made by nationalist CSOs that 
HROs protect or even assist terrorists or 
associated individuals and organizations. 
This line of thinking is propagated in order 
to embarrass democratic governments, 
which are then accused by nationalist CSOs 
of acting against their own official posi-
tions. Nationalist CSOs seek to link the pro-
cess of assisting HROs in Israel with being 
anti-Israeli, or even anti-Semitic, knowing 
that none of the donor states would toler-
ate being affiliated with such activities. 
The communicative strategies and dis-
course of nationalist CSOs, such as those of 
NGO Monitor, are not limited to personal 
meetings with state officials. They also in-
clude very sophisticated appeals to mem-
bers of parliaments and to public opinion 
in the targeted states in order to pressure 
governments. Such strategies cannot be 
implemented without the cooperation of 
government officials and ministries in 
Israel. Since the targeted governments in 
Europe and elsewhere have not shied away 
from meeting representatives of nationalist 
CSOs, they have enabled them to translate 
their threats to appeal to the public into 
successful policy. These governments could 
and should have a say in countering argu-
ments made by nationalist CSOs accusing 
them of supporting “anti-Israel NGOs.” If 
these governments wish to help Israel save 
the remaining liberal and democratic 
spaces it has, they have to stipulate their 
support for the Israeli state by respecting 
the rights of HROs to defend their values. 
Furthermore, these governments should 
make clear that their support for the state 
of Israel cannot be ignored by nationalist 
CSOs and government officials lobbying 
for one-sided funding policies. 
3) It is also necessary for major donors 
to liberal HROs to take note of the major 
differences between them and nationalist 
CSOs when it comes to their ability to in-
fluence state policies. What differentiates 
liberal HROs such as ACRI is that their 
efforts to influence state policies focus on 
the legality of government decisions and 
avoid ideological polemics; they focus on 
asking the state to implement its own laws 
rather than seeking to change them. State 
laws protecting human and citizenship 
rights are based on values that all demo-
cratic and liberal states share. These values 
are not necessarily respected by nationalist 
CSOs, and therefore the latter cannot be 
put on the same level with liberal HROs. 
The latter have to engage in an internal 
battle for their mere survival in Israel in 
the face of common attacks orchestrated 
by nationalist CSOs as well as nationalist 
politicians and parties in the Knesset and 
the government. 
One should note that certain donors 
such as the Ford Foundation have stopped 
supporting CSOs in Israel, making it more 
difficult for CSOs to fight against their own 
delegitimization and for their survival. It 
is clear that nationalist CSOs are seeking to 
engage liberal HROs in a survival struggle 
instead of defending liberalism and human 
rights. Liberal foundations must take note 
of the unique circumstances in which en-
emies of liberal and democratic values uti-
lize civil society tools to fight against them. 
4) It is very important for governments 
and donors to invite Israeli HROs and other 
liberal CSOs promoting democratic values 
to participate in public events in Europe 
and elsewhere in order to demonstrate their 
support for them, legitimate their activ-
ities, and open channels that enable the 
CSOs to communicate information and 
transmit knowledge. 
5) It is very crucial that Western media 
pay more attention to the activities and in-
formation provided by HROs and liberal 
CSOs in Israel. This media coverage could 
be central in blocking government policies 
that silence and delegitimize those who are 
promoting democratic values. 
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